{"id":6616,"date":"2021-03-08T09:44:54","date_gmt":"2021-03-08T09:44:54","guid":{"rendered":"http:\/\/www.ghr.agency\/?page_id=6616"},"modified":"2021-03-08T20:35:56","modified_gmt":"2021-03-08T20:35:56","slug":"international-health-regulations-duplicate-1","status":"publish","type":"page","link":"https:\/\/www.ghr.agency\/?page_id=6616","title":{"rendered":"International Health Regulations- From Surveillance to PHEICs"},"content":{"rendered":"\t\t
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From Surveillance to PHEIC<\/span><\/b><\/h2>\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t<\/div>\n\t\t\t\t
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 <\/span>Thus, the entire implementation of the IHR, which is tantamount to the Covid-pandemic response by the entire world community, has to depart from this common objective and principles of the IHR, being the baseline for a lawful mitigation of cross-border health threats.<\/span><\/p>\n

Institutional Aspects of the IHR<\/b>
<\/span><\/p>\n

The IHR instituted \u201cNational Focal Points<\/b>\u201d (NFP) at the national level which are the administrative bodies in charge for the notification of health threats towards the WHO, which are designated as IHR Focal Points and also implemented at the regional level.  <\/span>
<\/span><\/p>\n

In Germany, the designated NFP in charge is the \u201cGemeinsame Melde- und Lagezentrum von Bund und L\u00e4ndern (GMLZ)<\/a>\u201c, whereby special authority in case of infectious diseases is granted to the \u201eRobert-Koch-Institute.\u201c<\/span><\/p>\n

Definition of a PHEIC <\/span><\/b>
<\/span><\/p>\n

A \u201cpublic health emergency of international concern\u201d (PHEIC) is defined under the IHR <\/span><\/p>\n

\u201cas an extraordinary event which is<\/i> determined, to constitute a public health risk<\/b> to other States through the international spread of disease<\/b> and<\/i><\/span> to potentially require a coordinated international response<\/b><\/i>.\u201d
<\/span><\/p>\n

Importantly, \u201cpublic health risk<\/b>\u201d under the IHR means \u201ca likelihood of an event that may affect adversely the health<\/b> of<\/span> human populations, with an emphasis on one which may spread internationally<\/b> or<\/b> may present a serious and direct danger<\/b>.\u201d
<\/span><\/p>\n

If the PHEIC concept is analyzed from the perspective of severity, the possibility to
declare PHEICs without presenting a serious and direct danger<\/b> through
the interchangeability of \u201cinternational spread\u201d or \u201cserious and direct
danger\u201d is eminent. 
<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

As of yet, the WHO declared six PHEICs since the entry into force of the revised IHR 2007, <\/span><\/span>the H1N1 influenza virus pandemic (2009), the resurgence of wild
poliovirus (2014), the west Africa Ebola virus outbreak (2014), and the
Zika virus outbreak (2018), the 2018-20 Kivu Ebola epidemic and the Coronaviurs- Pandemic  (2020).
<\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

Core Capacity Requirements to Assess<\/b>
<\/span><\/p>\n

The SP are under an obligation, to permanently develop, strengthen and maintain the
capacity to detect, assess, notify and report events in accordance with these Regulations. These capacities are the so-called \u201ccore capacity requirements\u201d that are closely intertwined with the institutional entity of the NFP. <\/span><\/p>\n

This leads to the question, which events require detection and assessment as well as
subsequent notification via the NFP with the 24-hour time frame? <\/span><\/p>\n

The assessment of a detected \u201cpublic health event\u201d takes place in accordance with the
decision instrument included in Annex 2 of the IHR. <\/span><\/p>\n

If the event is assessed by the SP as unusual, unexpected<\/b> and posing a serious public health impact<\/b>, the event is directly notifiable within 24-hours in the case of SARS or a new strain of influenza.[4]<\/span><\/span><\/a> All other events require further assessment whether there is a significant risk of international spread or <\/b>of international travel or trade restriction. <\/b>Annex
2 provides no justification why the criteria of international spread as
well as the impact on travel and trade are presumed conditions in the
case of SARS or a new influenza strain. <\/span><\/span><\/p>\n

 <\/span><\/p>\n

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[1]<\/span><\/span><\/a> Annex 1 IHR.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[2]<\/span><\/span><\/a> Art. 5 IHR.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[3]<\/span><\/span><\/a> Art. 6 and Annex 2 IHR.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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[4]<\/span><\/span><\/a> As well as smallpox
 <\/span>and poliomyelitis due to wild-type poliovirus according to Annex 2 IHR.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

.<\/p>\n

<\/span><\/p>\n

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